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INTRODUCTION
The True Wisdom of the Bill of Rights
Philip B. Kurlandt
When The University of Chicago marked its centennial at the
same time that the nation's Bill of Rights was reaching its bicen-
tennial, the Law School held a two-day commemorative sympo-
sium and dinner featuring Justice John Paul Stevens, one of the
current keepers of the sacred flame: mind, I did not say Vestal Vir-
gin. This introduction to the papers delivered during the sympo-
sium is an act of supererogation. "If it be true that 'good wine
needs no bush,' 'tis true that a good play needs no epilogue."1 And
it is equally true that a good symposium needs no introduction.
Just as the reader of Shakespeare's As You Like It can eschew the
epilogue, so, too, can the reader of the symposium ignore the intro-
duction, with which listeners to the symposium were not burdened.
But having been given the opportunity to add my prejudices, culti-
vated over long decades, I offer a few banalities, in the hopes that
some moderns will consider them truisms even if others may re-
gard them as heresies.
As "every schoolboy knows,"2 the American Constitution, like
all Gaul, is made of three elements. The first creates the structure
and authority of a republican form of government. The second pro-
vides a division of powers among the various parts of the national
t William R. Kenan, Jr., Distinguished Service Professor (Emeritus), New Collegiate
Division, The University of Chicago, and The Law School. This introduction was prepared
for The Bill of Rights in the Welfare State: A Bicentennial Symposium, held at The Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School on October 25-26, 1991.
William Shakespeare, As You Like It (epilogue), in The Oxford Dictionary of Quota-
tions 427 (Oxford, 3d ed 1979).
"How haughtily he cocks his nose, To tell what every schoolboy knows." Jonathan
Swift, The Country Life, in id at 527.
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government-grossly labelled "separation of powers," which sug-
gests monopolies but is really concerned with checks and balances,
i.e., with shared powers rather than unification. And the third in-
hibits government power vis-A-vis the rights of individuals, rights
existent and potential, patent and latent. One prime objective of
each of the three parts was the liberty of the people.
It is error, although error more and more sought to be justified
by academic theory, that the Constitution represents a single, co-
hesive theory to be found in Locke or Machiavelli or Rousseau or
whomever the chosen swami may be. In fact, the Constitution was
a series of pragmatic responses to a series of practical problems, as
have been the Supreme Court decisions under it in the intervening
centuries, however much within the perimeters of the Constitu-
tion's language.
If there had been an academic celebration of the centennial of
the Bill of Rights, I expect that the "scholars" of a century ago
would have been a good deal more circumspect than those of to-
day. It was within the lifetimes of some professors not yet emeriti
that Learned Hand observed the distinction between a Luther and
an Erasmus:
You may take Martin Luther or Erasmus for your model, but
you cannot play both roles at once; you may not carry a sword
beneath a scholar's gown, lead flaming causes from a cloister,
Luther cannot be domesticated in a university. You cannot
raise a standard against oppression, or leap into the breach to
relieve injustice, and still keep an open mind to every discon-
certing fact, or an operi ear to the cold voice of doubt. I am
satisfied that a scholar who tries to combine these parts sells
his birthright for a mess of pottage; that when the final count
is made, it will be found that the impairment of his powers far
outweighs any possible contribution to the causes he has es-
poused. If he is fit to serve his calling at all, it is only because
he has learned not to serve in any other, for his singleness of
mind quickly evaporates in the fires of passions, however
holy.3
You can, however, be true to scholarship and recognize that
the Constitution is not a catalogue of rights and powers and duties.
The "rights of Englishmen," some of which are stated in "the Bill
of Rights," were not granted by the Constitution of 1789, just as
' Learned Hand, On Receiving an Honorary Degree, in Irving Dilliard, ed, The Spirit
of Liberty 138 (Phoenix, 3d ed 1960).
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the right to the writ of habeas corpus, often designated our most
fundamental civil right, was not granted by the Constitution. True,
some rights were specifically guaranteed by the Constitution. But
from the beginning of our history, the rights guaranteed in terms
by the Constitution have not been static. Some were not recog-
nized at the "birth of the nation," in the language that we now
know them, like the right to privacy and the right to freedom of
religion. All were to be defined and redefined over time. The real-
ity of our constitutional rights depended not on their identity over
time, but on their continuity over time. The rule of today may be
shown to have derived from the rule of yesterday, and the change
is explainable by reason. Our future, like our present, is anchored
in our past.
When today's constitutional rules are not dependent upon, or
derived from, yesterday's, when they are not to be justified by rea-
son but merely by fiat or personal prejudice, then the rule of law
implicit in "due process" is gone. There are times when changes
are made by fiat, thought to be demanded by circumstances, al-
though not explicated by them. These instances must be few and
far between, if we are to survive as a republic and a democracy. It
is the Constitution that is the symbol of the uniqueness of this
Nation, and the pith of that symbol-the Bill of Rights, however
defined-ideally rejects the notions of arbitrary government. We
pour into it, and therefore take out of it, an entire people's guide
to what we need "to grow more civilized," a slow, painful, costly
and always difficult choice.
In common parlance, the first Ten Amendments are "The Bill
of Rights," the bicentennial of which we celebrated in December of
1991 on the two-hundredth anniversary of Virginia's ratification.
But it was asserted by Hamilton in Federalist No. 84 that the en-
tire Constitution was a Bill of Rights:
The truth is, after all the declamations we have heard, that
the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every
useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS. The several bills of
rights in Great Britain form its Constitution, and conversely
the constitution of each State is its bill of rights. And the pro-
posed Constitution, if adopted, will be the bill of rights of the
Union.4
Federalist 84 (Hamilton) in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 510, 515
(Mentor, 1961) (emphasis in original).
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In the end, the body of the Constitution did provide for trial by
jury in criminal cases, did provide for trial in the vicinage, and did
afford a definition of treason while limiting its sanction. Provision
was made against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder; and,
finally, provision was made that the mother writ of all civil lib-
erty-habeas corpus-should "not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."5
And so the third kind of constitutional provision afforded pro-
tection for the individual against the iniquities of govern-
ment-particular iniquities, to be sure, that the Americans of 1789
and their English forebears had already suffered, and for most of
which they had found some specific protection through the work-
ings of the common law.
It was about a half-century ago that the principles of the
American Bill of Rights enjoyed a renaissance-perhaps "nais-
sance" would be more apt-in this nation. In Europe and Asia it
had been demonstrated that tyrants could successfully manage so-
cieties in which a person lives without rights against government,
where any individual's life, liberty, and property are destructable
at the whim of officials. Only in the United States and England,
and to a lesser extent in France, did "freedom" have substantial
roots. And these roots, like the lesser ones planted by the "War to
End All Wars," had been all but extirpated by deep economic de-
pression, by a morbid fear that "socialism" was more of a threat to
freedom than the serfdom of a medieval monarchy, by the para-
noia labelled by Sinclair Lewis: "It Can't Happen Here." The
United States was faced with the realization that its own form of
racism was no more rational than Nazism, if usually less official.
The consequence of this realization was the growth of the Bill
of Rights through the incorporation of their essence against the
States. I suppose it must be acknowledged that this growth began
in the Hughes Court, when Benjamin Cardozo wrote the decision
in Palko v Connecticut6 for the Court. When the Court deals with
concepts such as liberty, it is giving itself extensive authority to
oversee actions of the other two national branches of government
and of the states toward individuals.
Cardozo's opinion in Palko was articulated, it will be noted,
not in terms of literary construction, but in the larger vagary of
"logical imperatives":
US Const, Art I, § 9, cl 2.
6 302 US 319 (1937).
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So it has come about that the domain of liberty withdrawn by
the Fourteenth Amendment from encroachments by the states
has been enlarged by latter-day judgments to include liberty
of the mind as well as liberty of action. The extension indeed,
became a logical imperative when once it was recognized, as
long ago it was, that liberty is something more than exemp-
tion from physical restraint, and even in the field of substan-
tive rights and duties the legislative judgment, if oppressive
and arbitrary, may be overridden by the courts.7
But this rejection of logic-chopping in favor of comprehension of
purpose and function has long been recognized, as Holmes's famil-
iar words in Gompers remind us:
[T]he provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical for-
mulas having their essence in their form; they are organic liv-
ing institutions transplanted from English soil. Their signifi-
cance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by
taking words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin
and the line of their growth."
To conclude, I suppose that what I want to say is really reduc-
ible to three observations:
First, the rights guaranteed by the Constitution in the Bill of
Rights and in other places in the text require construction and do
not involve merely the application of a fixed rule to a fixed fact.
The significance of the facts and the function of the rule in the
circumstances is dependent on the wisdom of 'the judgment of
those charged with the adjudication. Our legal system is based on a
different notion of reasoning than our sciences; it is inductive
rather than deductive, which makes knowledge of the past so much
more indispensable to the present and the future. This wisdom re-
quired of a Supreme Court Justice, alas, is not a subject communi-
cable in the classroom, if communicable at all.
Second, the restraints of the Constitution are directed to the
government and not to the individuals who are the governed.9
Thus the Constitution is a different order of law. True, individual
freedom is more at risk from government behavior than from the
' Id at 327.
8 Gompers v United States, 233 US 604, 610 (1914).
9 The exception is, of course, the Thirteenth Amendment, which applies to both indi-
viduals and the government: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punish-
ment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." US Const, Amend XIII, § 1.
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behavior of other individuals, but this in part is dependent on gov-
ernment fulfilling its function of protecting individuals from impo-
sitions by other individuals. A person's life, liberty, and property
are at risk from both private and public force, if in different de-
grees, and so the judicial task must encompass protections of a
nonconstitutional order as well.
Third, the "liberty" that the Bill of Rights and cognate provi-
sions in other parts of the Constitution protect is essentially the
liberty to be different. It is here that the two centennial celebra-
tions overlap, in their commitment to diversity, in their recognition
that conformity and uniformity are denials of the essence of
human personality. At the opening dinner of The University of
Chicago's Centennial Celebration, Milton Friedman made the
point thus:
"Why was one university so productive?"-asked economist
Milton Friedman, AM, '33, one of the two U of C Nobelists
who addressed the assembled diners. "In order to be a rich
seedbed for new development, you do have to have a respect
for diversity and a respect for innovation." 10
Judge Learned'Hand, himself born twenty years before the Uni-
versity, put it a little differently:
Because once you get people believing that there is an author-
itative well of wisdom to which they can turn for absolutes,
you have dried up the springs on which they must in the end
draw even for the things of this world. As soon as we cease to
pry about at random, we shall come to rely on accredited bod-
ies of authoritative dogma; and as soon as we come to rely
upon accredited bodies of authoritative dogma, not only are
the days of our Liberty over, but we have lost the password
that has hitherto opened to us the gates of success as well."
There never has been more uniformity of interpretation of the
language of the Bill of Rights than there has been a demonstrated
singlemindedness of decision by the Justices of the Supreme
Court. It will be too late for the Bill of Rights to fulfill its func-
tions if the' Court begins to speak with but one voice, for then it is
not likely to be a judicial voice but a political one.
10 Mary Ruth Yoe, Pomp Meets Circumstance, U Chi Mag 26, 30 (Dec 1991).
" Learned Hand, Liberty, in Dilliard, ed, The Spirit of Liberty at 153 (cited in note 3).
